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Congested highways and airports, collapsing bridges, deteriorating
roads, periodic water shortages, and suspect waste disposal facilities
bear silent witness that the infrastructure of our nation, currently valued
at close to $1 trillion, is inadequate. To shore up America’s foundations,
many economists and policy analysts have urged the federal govern-
ment to increase spending substantially. The urgency of the problem,
however, does not preclude the need to ask whether the current use of
facilities is efficient, whether choices about how current facilities are
used are possible, and how current use will affect the efficiency of new
facilities. In fact, surprisingly large benefits are to be gained from
making efficient use of our current infrastructure by pricing it and
investing in it efficiently. Efficient pricing and investment will reduce the
need for massive public investment and will prevent the recurrence of
infrastructure problems. The primary reason why the current facilities
are gravely deficient is that they are priced in ways that do not reflect
economic costs and designed in ways that result in higher life-cycle costs
of use.
In their anxiety to address the infrastructure problem, policymakers
are pushing policies that, if adopted, would indefinitely foreclose
consideration of efficient pricing and investment. Congressional re-
newal of the gas tax in 1991, for example, would perpetuate a method of
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charging trucks for interstate highway use that could foreclose consid-
eration of the far more efficient cost-based, axle-weight charge for nearly
a decade. It is therefore crucial for policymakers to consider more
efficient infrastructure policy before the window of opportunity is
closed.
The Theory of Efficient Infrastructure Policy
The nation’s infrastructure assets consist primarily of highways,
airports, transit stock, water resources, and water supply and waste
disposal facilities. At a valuation of nearly half a trillion dollars,
highways account for more than half of these assets. Infrastructure
supports a community’s basic activities and any expansion of them.
Putting it slightly more technically and in a transportation context,
infrastructure provides capacity, in the form of traffic lanes and runways,
as well as durability, in the form of thick pavement. Users of the
infrastructure impose costs on themselves and others by contributing to
congestion, which increases travel time, and by wearing out the infra-
structure, which necessitates maintenance expenditures to repair pave:
ment and vehicles. Efficient infrastructure policy maximizes the differ-
ence between social benefits and the costs of use, including the costs
that users impose on others, by specifying pricing guidelines to regulate
demand and investment guidelines that will specify design. A mathe-
matical derivation of these guidelines is contained in Winston (1985); a
nontechnical discussion is presented here.
Although the theory of efficient pricing and investment was orig-
inally developed to analyze transportation problems, and indeed much
of the following discussion will draw upon transportation infrastruc-
ture, it can be applied to any infrastructure problem.1 The efficient
pricing rule calls for infrastructure use to be priced at short-run marginal
cost. Because the user will take only his average cost into account when
making travel decisions and ignore his contribution to congestion and
infrastructure wear, short-run marginal costs to the public will exceed
private average cost. The infrastructure authority must therefore set
congestion tolls and charges for infrastructure wear to close this gap.
The efficient investment rule calls for capacity and durability to be
1 Although the literature on optimal pricing and investment has a long and distin-
guished history that dates back to the writings of Pigou and Knight among others (see
Winston (1985) for a survey), Mohring and Harwitz (1962) were the first to rigorously
determine optimal pricing and investment policies in a long-run framework. Recent work
has extended Mohring and Harwitz’s model to account for demand uncertainty, lumpy
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produced to the point where the marginal benefit from increasing
investment in each dimension equals its marginal cost. Optimal invest-
ment is commonly viewed as being achieved in the long run. The pricing
and investment rules jointly constitute an efficient long-run policy, in
which a user’s marginal cost is determined at the optimal level of
capacity and durability.
Mohring and Harwitz (1962) applied existing theoretical results to
transportation and showed that the financial viability of a public infra-
structure facility under optimal pricing and investment depends upon
the technological properties of its cost function. If capacity and durabil-
ity costs are jointly characterized by constant returns to scale, then the
facility’s revenue from marginal cost pricing will fully cover its capital
and operating costs. If costs are characterized by increasing returns to
scale, then the facility’s revenues from marginal cost pricing will fall short
of its operating and capital costs and it will require a subsidy; if costs are
characterized by decreasing returns to scale, then the facility’s revenues
from marginal cost pricing will exceed its operating and capital costs.
The following discussion summarizes in some detail the economic
effects of optimal pricing of, and investment in, highways and airports.
The discussion is then extended to other infrastructure facilities.
Efficient Highway Pricing and Investment
A country laced with nearly four million miles of roads, as is the
United States, would not appear to have a serious highway infrastruc-
ture problem. Road mileage, however, is not the issue. Roughly half of
America’s nonlocal roads are currently in fair or poor condition, and
traffic during commuter rush hours approaches capacity on one-half of
the urban interstates and on one-third of the other main arterial
highways (Small, Winston and Evans 1989). Most proposed solutions to
these problems call for substantial increases in annual highway spend-
ing. But efficient highway pricing and investment could dramatically
improve the condition and performance of our roads and require only a
small increase in capital spending.
Historically, gasoline taxes have been used to charge vehicles for
their use of roads and to finance expenditures. Tolls are levied on some
roads, and eleven states have adopted taxes that assess trucks according
to their total weight and distance traveled, but such charges account for
a small share of highway revenues.2 Although the gasoline tax was
2 Wyoming, Colorado, and Nevada have recently repealed their weight-distance
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probably a reasonable way to raise revenue as long as roads were
uncongested and in good condition, of late, revenue shortfalls have
made it increasingly necessary to supplement the gas tax with state and
local revenues. The reason for the shortfalls is that fuel tax receipts
fluctuate with economic conditions and fuel prices, and the recent trend
in fuel tax revenues has been downward in real terms (because of
improved fuel economy and increased use of untaxed gasohol).3 These
shortfalls are one reason to move away from the fuel tax as a source of
highway revenue. A more important reason is that the fuel tax does not
reflect the pavement damage and congestion caused by vehicles.
Charges for Pavement Wear
Pavements do not last forever. They become worn as vehicles pass
over them and they eventually require resurfacing in the form of an
overlay. Trucks and buses cause most of the damage, cars very little.
Pavement damage itself depends on vehicle weight per axle, not total
vehicle weight. The damage caused by an axle is defined in terms of the
number of "equivalent standard axle loads" (esals) causing the same
damage; the standard is a single axle of 18,000 pounds. This damaging
power rises very steeply with its load.4 For example, the rear axle of a
typical thirteen-ton van causes over 1,000 times as much damage as that
of a car.
A marginal-cost pavement wear charge can be assessed by multi-
plying a vehicle’s esal-miles by the marginal cost of an esal-mile. For
example, Small, Winston and Evans (1989, p. 42) estimated the marginal
cost of an esal-mile on rural interstate highways to be 1.5 cents. Thus a
truck equivalent to two standard axles traveling 100 miles on a rural
interstate would accrue 200 esal-miles and a charge of $3.00.
Such a pavement wear charge would accurately reflect the damage
caused by vehicles using the road. It would also give truckers an
incentive to reduce axle weights by shifting to trucks with more axles,
thereby reducing highway damage and maintenance expenditures and
extending pavement life. The fuel tax currently in use provides truckers
with the opposite incentive: the tax rises with a vehicle’s axles, since
trucks with more axles require larger engines and get lower fuel
economy. Similarly, many state turnpikes charge more for a given
weight if it is carried on a vehicle with many axles.
3 This downward trend appears to have reversed in just the past few years.
4 It was previously thought to rise to the fourth power, but Small and Winston (1988)
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Optimal Durability of Pavement
The damage that a truck does to a pavement depends not only on
its axle weight but also on the durability (thickness) of the pavement.5
Historically, pavement thickness has been strongly influenced by design
guidelines issued by the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO). Recently, Small and Winston (1988)
reexamined the recommendations issued by AASHTO with a model that
determined optimal thickness by minimizing the sum of capital and
maintenance costs. They found that optimal thicknesses were signifi-
cantly higher than current thicknesses, especially for heavily traveled
interstates.6 Greater road thicknesses would substantially reduce annual
maintenance expenditures and, because they would lower the marginal
cost of an esal-mile, would also soften the impact of taxes promoting
efficient pavement wear.
The economic effects of building roads to optimal durability and of
charging truckers marginal-cost pavement wear taxes are shown in
Table 1. Optimal durability and the marginal cost of an esal-mile are
determined by the Small-Winston model along with extensive Federal
Highway Administration data on the inventory of highway types and
traffic levels; truckers’ vehicle shifts in response to the marginal-cost tax
and associated welfare effects are predicted by a truck-type choice
model, where truck types are defined by trailer and axle configuration;
and freight shifts to or from railroads are predicted by a shipper
modal-choice model. The effects of the (first) best policy are shown in
the first column of Table 1; columns 2 and 3 show the results of partial
implementation. Gains in net welfare from the (first) best policy total
$7.75 billion annually (1982 dollars). The source of these benefits is a
huge annual reduction in maintenance costs of $9.4 billion, which is
achieved with only a $1.3 billion annualized increase in capital costs.
This policy is also attractive from a political viewpoint because it entails
little redistribution. In fact, all major highway interests gain. Truckers
and their customers gain because increased durability lowers the efficient
road-wear charges from today’s levels. The public sector gains because
trucking firms distribute their loads over more axles (change vehicle
types), reducing standard loadings (esals) by 38 percent, reducing
highway maintenance expenditures. Railroads gain slightly from an
s Besides making a pavement thicker, durability can also be improved by improving
drainage, using better construction materials and so on. Aging and weathering leave a
pavement more vulnerable to heavy loads.
6 Small and Winston argue that their recommendations differ from AASHTO°s
because AASHTO failed to incorporate economic optimization into the desig£ procedure
and relied on a relationship between pavement life and pavement thickness that was
statistically flawed.188 Clifford M. Winston
Table 1,
Annual Economic Effects of Efficient Infrastructure Policy for Roads
Billions of 1982 Dollars
Change,~ Relative to Current Practice
Item
Efficient
Efficient Pricing Efficient Pricing Investment




Maintenance savings $ 9.428 $ 6,441 $ 8.536
Annualized capital savings -1.276 -- -2.236
Total savings 8.152 6.441 6.300
Trucking firms’ and shippers’
welfareb/ 0.134 -5.586 --
Government revenues -0.574 3.884 --
Modal shifting°/
Modal surplus 0,029 0.204 --
Rail profits 0.011 0.411 --
Total welfare $ 7,752 $ 5,354 $ 6.300
Change in standard
Ioadings’~/(Percent)              -38.12%         -48.38%            0.0%
a~ Positive dollar values indicate an improvement.
b/These estimates do not include changes in user costs (vehicle damage and slower speeds due to
damaged pavement). Small, Winston, and Evans (1989) point out there are difficulties in obtaining
reliable estimates of this effect. Their rough estimates indicate that under optimal pricing and investment
user costs are reduced by $3.03 billion when they are optimized along with maintenance and capital
costs. User costs still fall by $1.8 billion under optimal pricing and investment when they are not explicitly
optimized,
c/Modal surplus measures the benefits to shippers who shift freight to or from railroads in response to the
change in truck taxes.
d/The reduction in standard Ioadings is accomplished with only a small change in ton-miles that results
from modal shifting; most of the reduction is from truck-type shifts.
Source: Small, Winston and Evans (1989).
increase in traffic,7 and the budget balance of the federal government is
improved because the reductions in maintenance expenses greatly offset
the loss in highway revenues and the increase in capital expenses.
The economic and political importance of combining optimal pric-
ing and investment is also shown in Table 1. Setting efficient pavement
wear taxes at current highway durability (column 2) produces a smaller
welfare gain and generates substantial redistribution from the trucking
..... industry to the public treasury. This finding confirms that truckers are
7 Railroads gain because truck charges tend to rise on intercity traffic shipped long
distances in large quantities; hence their business grows despite a small overall decrease
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currently being undercharged for their use of the roads, but it also
reveals how !nadequate infrastructure investment can penalize an
industry. Building roads to optimal durability while maintaining current
pricing (column 3) also produces a smaller welfare gain and requires
greater capital outlays. Because optimal investment is a long-run policy
and the benefits from reduced maintenance expenses will be seen only
several years after initial capital outlays, extra capital expenses could
arouse short-term budgetary concerns. Nonetheless, the annualized
benefit-cost ratio from optimal investment approaches 4:1, which is a
healthy return.
Congestion Charges
Traffic congestion appears to be one of the most intractable infra-
structure problems of the nation. Regardless of what policies are
implemented from high-occupancy vehicle lanes to subsidies for pub-
lic transit--delays become longer and drivers and passengers become
angrier. A conclusion being reached more and more frequently is that
we have no choice but to build more roads. At first sight, increasing
highway capacity appears as sensible as increasing highway durability,
but capacity and durability inadequacies have different effects on road
users. Few vehicles are discouraged from using a road because of its
durability problems. Therefore, optimal durability produces benefits
without significantly increasing use. On the other hand, because a lot of
motorists are discouraged from using a road when it is congested, traffic
will be attracted to it if capacity is expanded to relieve congestion.
Benefits may be accrued, but congestion will persist in the long run.8
The only way to reduce congestion permanently is to set an explicit price
for capacity.
Congestion pricing has been advocated by economists for many
years. But it has either been ignored by policymakers or been dismissed
on political and practical grounds.9 Small (1982), however, shows that
objections by those who protest that lower-income drivers would be
unfairly penalized are unfounded if revenues are used properly. If toll
revenues are explicitly used to lower property taxes, invest in public
transit, replace registration fees or fuel taxes, or invest in central cities,
8 This is known as Downs’s law (1962, p. 393): on urban commuter expressways,
peak-hour traffic congestion rises to meet maximum capacity because commuters shift
from less preferred modes and times of day,
9 For example, congestion pricing is not mentioned in an eight-page cover story on
gridlock in Time (1988). It is dismissed by Ross Sandler, New York City Commissioner of
Transportation, in a 1989 New York Times article where he is quoted as saying, "What
would you do--put tolls on all the highways?"190 Clifford M. Winston
congestion pricing can actually work to the benefit of all income
classes, lo
Objections that tolls are impractical are also overstated. Congestion
pricing can be implemented without disrupting a traveler’s journey. An
automated vehicle identification (AVI) system, in which an electronic
number plate is mounted underneath each vehicle, can be used to
transmit a numbered identification to a control center each time a vehicle
passes over a power loop embedded beneath a toll site. The vehicle
owner is then sent a monthly bill similar to a phone bill. The techno-
logical side of such a system has been tested in Hong Kong and found
to perform exceptionally well (Catling and Harbord 1985; Hau 1989).11 In
the United States, an AVI system is currently operating on the North
Dallas Tollway.
Because the effects of congestion pricing vary widely by locale, most
studies of its effects have been site-specific. But a study by Lee (1982)
made a rough estimate of the effect of adopting congestion pricing
nationwide and found that it would generate nearly $6 billion (1981
dollars) in annual net benefits, mostly in the form of travel delay
savings. If congestion pricing were accompanied by optimal invest-
ments in road capacity, annual net benefits would be even higher and
the initial redistribution from road users to the road authorities would
probably be less.
Highway Finance
Although efficient road pricing and investment would generate
substantial benefits, one must estimate the degree of scale economies in
highway production to determine whether this policy would enable
highways to be financially self-sufficient. Because highways produce
two "products," traffic volume requiring capacity (for example, number
of lanes) and standard loadings requiring durability (such as thickness),
multiproduct scale economies must be estimated. These economies are
a function of product-specific economies and economies of joint produc-
tion, commonly referred to as economies of scope. Small, Winston and
Evans (1989) find strong product-specific economies associated with
producing heavy vehicle loadings because the ability of a pavement to
withstand traffic increases far more than proportionally with its thick-
ness. They conclude from the literature that mild product-specific
10 Virginia Secretary of Transportation John G. Milliken recently signalled his state’s
willingness to use Dulles Toll Road profits for express mass transit service.
11 Hau also discusses a solution for overcoming some of the objections in Hong Kong
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economies result from producing traffic volume. They also find dis-
economies of scope from jointly producing volume and standard load-
ings: as the road is made wider to accommodate more traffic, the cost of
-any additional thickness required to handle heavy vehicles rises because
all. lanes must normally be built to the same thickness. Multiproduct
scale economies are estimated by combining these components.12 The
result is that the product-specific economies are virtually offset by the
diseconomies of scope, which leads to approximately constant returns to
scale in highway production and a budget for urban roads that ap-
proaches long-run balance.13 For uncongested rural roads, durability
economies would lead to a budget deficit, and additional fees would be
required to attain a balanced highway budget.
This finding reveals an important additional benefit from conges-
tion pricing. If efficient road-wear pricing is undertaken alone, the road
authority would face a deficit for urban roads because of the economies
of pavement durability.14 But when efficient road-wear pricing is com-
bined with efficient congestion pricing, the (marginal) cost of building
the pavement itself is effectively charged twice: once from trucks
because they, require a thicker pavement and once from cars because
they require a wider pavement. The result is that losses from pavement
durability economies are eliminated.
As a further benefit, congestion pricing could substantially reduce
the public transit operating deficit, which, according to the Urban Mass
Transportation Administration, approached $9 billion in 1985. The
higher congestion tolls will cause some motorists to shift to public
transit,15 This increased ridership will cause an increase in transit
The mathematical expression for these multiproduct scale economies is:
wSv + (1 - w)SQ
Sra = 1 - Sc
where Sv is product-specific returns to traffic volume, SQ is product-specific returns to
durability, w is the proportionof user charges accounted for by congestion charges, and
Sc is economies of scope.
13 Small, Winston and Evans (1989) discuss the possible efficiency gain from a road
system that separates truck and auto traffic, which is motivated by their finding of
diseconomies of scope.
14 Small, Winston and Evans (1989) find that the "pavement deficit" is reduced by
optimal pavement wear pricing and investment from its current level of $16.16 billion
(1982) dollars) to $9.84 billion (1982 dollars). The pavement deficit is defined for the
optimal and current policy as the difference between tax revenues and the annualized
value of resurfacing expenditures and the cost of the paving material itself.
is For example, Viton (1983) finds that congestion pricing in the San Francisco Bay
Area would raise mass transit’s share of downtown commuters by 10 to 20 percentage
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capacity, which is usually achieved by running buses or trains more
frequently. The increased frequency will lower expected wait times and
generate even more ridership. The result is that congestion pricing in
combination with appropriate pricing and service responses by transit
agencies could raise transit revenues and reduce the need for federal,
state, and local operating subsidies. 16
Efficient Airport Pricing and Investment
Airport congestion and flight delays are increasingly receiving
public attention. Many observers argue that the problem stems from a
lack of airport capacity, citing the fact that no major airports have been
built since 1974. Federal support of the proposed new Denver airport,
estimated to cost $2.5 billion, is seen as a constructive step in alleviating
air delays.
Congestion has probably not affected air travel choices to the same
degree it has affected automobile travel choices, and additional airport
capacity is not likely to attract as much traffic as additional highway
capacity. But the tremendous growth in air travel during the past
decade, partly spurred by deregulation, and the high cost and long lead
times associated with building new airports suggest that society will be
faced with a difficult and expensive catch-up task if it commits itself to
reducing air congestion simply by building more airports. A less costly
and more effective long-run solution is to price and invest more
efficiently in existing airports.
Efficient Runway Pricing and Capacity
The most common method of assessing landing fees at airports is by
aircraft weight. Thus during a given hour a jumbo jet pays considerably
more to land than a small private plane. Weight-based landing fees were
probably a reasonable way to allocate airport costs and raise revenue
when airports were uncongested, but today the principal cost that an
aircraft imposes when it takes off or lands is that it delays other aircraft
from these activities. Morrison and Winston (1989) found such a delay to
be substantial. For example, the elasticity of average departure delay
with respect to commercial carrier departures is 2.9; the elasticity with
respect to general aviation departures is 2.5. Current landing fees
16 Winston (1991) discusses how efficient highway pricing and investment will
provide additional benefits by improving performance in the deregulated motor carrier
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Table 2
Annual Economic Effects of Efficient Infrastructure Policy for Airports
Billions of 1988 Dollars
Item
Change,a~ Relative to Current Practice
Efficient Pricing




Consumer surplus change from
landing and takeoff feesb $ 1.10 $-12.53
Reduced delay to travelers 7.91 3.62
Carriers’ operating cost savings 2.77 1.23
Airport revenues less costs -0.77 11.50
Total welfare change $11.01 $ 3.82
a~ Positive dollar values indicate an improvement.
b/The consumer surplus change measures the effect of changes in landing and takeoff fees on travelers
who continue to fly and those who are driven from or attracted to airline travel.
Source: Morrison and Winston (1989, p. 93).
undercharge aircraft in inverse proportion to their weight, because they
do not account for the congestion externality.
An airport’s capacity is primarily determined by its number of
runways.17 If it already owns the land, an additional runway 10,000 feet
long and 150 feet wide can be constructed for roughly $40 million (1987
dollars) (Morrison and Winston 1989). Optimal runway capacity is
reached when the marginal cost of an additional runway is equated with
the marginal benefit of reduced delay.
The effects of replacing weight-based landing fees with marginal-
cost congestion fees and of building the optimal number of runways at
airports are shown in Table 2. Marginal-cost fees include delay costs and
marginal maintenance, operations, and administrative costs. Optimal
runway capacity is determined under the assumption that no additional
land is needed for runway expansion. Although this is an unreasonable
assumption for some airports, other capacity-enhancing mechanisms
are or will be available that could by themselves produce a similar effect
or enable runways to be built closer together at airports with limited
room for growth.18 In any case, this assumption produces an upward
bias in the estimate of net benefits. An airline carrier choice model is
used to estimate travelers’ value of the reduced delay and of the change
17 Terminal facilities and gate space also determine capacity.
18 These mechanisms include high-speed runway exits, microwave landing systems,
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in their surplus in response to the change in landing fees. The effects of
efficient runway pricing and investment are shown in the first column of
Table 2, and the effects of adopting efficient runway pricing at current
runway investment are shown in the second column.
Optimal airport pricing and investment policy could generate
roughly $11 billion (1988 dollars) in annual benefits. Travelers would
reap $8 billion in reduced delays and face lower fares, because the
expansion in runway capacity called for under optimal investment,
combined with congestion pricing, would reduce congestion to such an
extent that on average landing fees would fall.19 The annualized cost of
the runway investment is only about $1.5 billion. Carriers benefit from
lower operating costs, which result from reduced delay. Airports’ net
revenues would fall slightly, but, as argued below, they would become
financially self-sufficient.20
The combination of efficient pricing and efficient investment poli-
cies is again economically and politically important. If airports adopted
efficient congestion fees alone, net welfare would improve by only
one-third as much, and considerable redistribution would occur to
airports from travelers, who would primarily absorb the higher takeoff
and landing fees through higher fares.
Combining efficient pricing and investment would also postpone
the need to build expensive new airports. The FAA estimates that the
new Denver airport will reduce current delays at the Denver Stapleton
airport by 35 to 50 percent. Optimal pricing and investment at Stapleton
airport would lower delays by at least that much at lower cost (Morrison
and Winston 1989). Continued growth in air travel will eventually
necessitate the construction of new airports, but these decisions will be
made efficiently only if our current airport capacity is used optimally.
Airport Finance
As a simplification, airports produce two. outputs, commercial
carrier operations and general aviation operations. Although general
aviation usually requires less terminal capacity and shorter runways
than commercial aircraft, Morrison (1983) finds that airports are charac-
terized by (overall) constant returns to scale and would therefore be
financially self-sufficient under optimal pricing and investment. Their
self-sufficiency would help lower the federal government deficit because
19 General aviation travelers will face higher landing fees. But the Morrison-Winston
model does not account for the greater flexibility that general aviation travelers have in
their choice of airport and in arrival and departure time, thus their losses are overstated.
20 Winston (1991) discusses how efficient airport pricing and investment will provide
additional benefits by improving performance in the deregulated airline industry.HOW EFFICIENT IS CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AND PRICING?      195
airports would no longer need funds from the government to finance
improvements.
Efficient Pricing and Investment of Other Facilities
Less empirical work is available on the economic effects of efficient
infrastructure policy on bridges, water supply, and water resources, but
the information that is available suggests that significant benefits could
also be derived from more efficient use of these facilities by pricing them
and investing in them more efficiently.21
In contrast with pavement wear, bridge wear depends solely on
vehicle weight, roughly in proportion to its third power (Moses, Schilling
and Raju 1987). Thus, a fully efficient highway tax would account for a
vehicle’s contribution to damage from bridge stress by including a
charge related to weight. Catastrophic bridge failure is caused by
simultaneous passage of heavy vehicles over a given bridge section.
Simultaneous passage and thus the likelihood of catastrophic failure
could be reduced by congestion pricing, which would spread the traffic
flow. Current bridge design could also be economically suboptimal.
Design guidelines are not explicitly based on optimization and include
arbitrary margins of safety. Efficient bridge investment and design could
result in significant cost savings.
Reisner’s Cadillac Desert (1986) focused popular attention on the
nation’s inefficient policy toward water use: water is priced below
marginal cost, far below for agricultural uses, and laws regarding water
ownership provide farmers with a disincentive to conserve water. The
current infrastructure stock for water (dams and aqueducts) is ineffi-
ciently used, while the price distortions and the absence of a market for
water in most states have spurred proposals by some Western locales to
build expensive new dams. Benefits would clearly be derived from
efficient pricing of and investment in water supply.
Use of the nation’s waterways could also be improved through
more efficient pricing. Until October 1980, no charges were imposed on
users of inland waterways. Some believe that this policy was justified
because the rights-of-way are a pure public good. But Boger (1985) has
shown positive social marginal costs of waterway use, Chiefly caused by
congestion at locks. Efficiency could be improved if the current nominal
charges were replaced by a marginal-cost congestion fee.
21 For an overview of the inefficiencies in waste disposal see National Council on
Public Works Improvement (1988).196 Clifford M. Winston
Summary of Benefits
The potential clearly exists to realize substantial benefits from an
efficient infrastructure policy. The annual welfare gain from efficient
pricing of and investment in highways and airports alone exceeds $25
billion (1988 dollars). It can be obtained for only about $3 billion (1988
dollars) in annualized capital expenditures to increase road thicknesses
and to build more runways. Benefits would actually be higher than
these estimates suggest, because performance in the deregulated airline
and trucking industries would improve. Optimal pricing of and invest-
ment in other infrastructure facilities would add even more to the
benefits tally.
Alternatives to Efficient Infrastructure Policy
Many people in public and private life question whether the
benefits from efficient infrastructure policy would be achieved in prac-
tice and whether they would be worth the cost of politically undesirable
redistribution. These fundamental concerns will be addressed in the
process of evaluating alternatives to efficient infrastructure policy,
focusing on highways and airports. The alternatives include traditional
approaches, privatizing infrastructure facilities, and significantly in-
creasing infrastructure spending.
Traditional Approaches
Most policymakers fall back on traditional approaches such as the
gas tax or moderate increases in spending to solve current problems. My
analysis of efficient pricing showed how current road and airport
pricing, which chiefly relies on the gas tax and weight-based landing
fees, is highly inefficient.22 To simply increase spending, especially
without charging efficient prices, could also be inefficient. But policy-
makers find current approaches appealing because they are practical
and appear politically safe. Thus they must be convinced that efficient
pricing and investment can be implemented and will not inevitably be
faced with political opposition by stakeholders.
Technological feasibility. Efficient infrastructure pricing and invest-
ment can be implemented with proven technologies. The axle-weight
22 The Bush Administration has recently proposed consideration of passenger facility
charges at airports. These charges are not based on the aircraft’s contribution to
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truck tax is currently being implemented in Oregon. A 1988 U.S.
Department of Transportation study concluded that the administrative
and compliance costs of this tax at the national level would be little more
per vehicle than the current federal heavy-vehicle use tax. Although the
theoretically ideal road-wear charge would vary by road type to reflect
the much greater vulnerability of thin roads to damage, Small, Winston
and Evans (1989) found that simplified charges, which would be easier
to administer, would retain a surprisingly large proportion of the
benefits. For example, a two-part axle-weight tax, with one rate applied
to freeways and another to nonfreeways, would provide more than 99
percent of the welfare gain possible from the axle-weight tax applied to
all road types.
As noted earlier, road congestion pricing could be implemented
without disrupting a traveler’s journey, using an automated vehicle
identification system. This system could permit officials to set a detailed
pricing schedule with charges varying by time and locale. Although it
would be costly to install, it would represent a far more efficient
investment for reducing traffic congestion than the "smart cars-smart
streets" technology, which is starting to capture the imagination of the
public and the federal government despite having an estimated cost of
$18 billion to build and $4 billion a year to operate and maintain.23
Efficient airport pricing would be easy to implement. Because hourly
takeoff and landing activity is recorded by control towers, the current
weight-based fees simply could be replaced by a schedule of hourly
takeoff and landing congestion charges.
Efficient infrastructure investment would use current construction
technology to add thickness to roads and more runways at airports. The
best way to upgrade existing highways would be to increase thickness--
beyond what would normally be added to restore its original strength--
each time a pavement is resurfaced. Small, Winston and Evans (1989)
found that the benefits from increased thickness do not depend on
unrealistic precision in building design. Even large errors in forecasts of
traffic loadings do not affect the benefits by more than 10 percent. New
runways should be efficiently added to congested airports that have
available land.24 New landing aids and better technology for air traffic
23 The smart cars-smart streets technology amounts to computerized displays in
automobiles that receive instantaneous traffic updates and detour instructions from a
traffic management center. See John Cushman, "Smart Cars and Highways to Help
Unsnarl Gridlock," The New York Times, April 12, 1990, p. A16.
24 At least 50 percent of the congested airports have available land for additional
runways. Environmental concerns would have to be met. One could argue that noise
pollution would be reduced by efficient airport policy because use would be less
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controllers could enable runways to be spaced more closely together.
The benefits from efficient airport investment do not have to depend on
great precision in airport design. Morrison and Winston (1989) find
significant benefits would result at many airports from just one addi-
tional runway.
Political considerations. It is widely believed that the radical revision
of infrastructure pricing called for under efficient pricing is impractical
because it would generate politically unfavorable redistribution.25 Cur-
rent approaches to pricing, however, are held hostage so relentlessly by
political forces that policymakers are effectively prevented from taking
any substantial steps to improve the infrastructure.
The federal government’s decade-long aversion to new taxes com-
plicates raising the federal gasoline tax. Individual states face strong
voter opposition to proposed gasoline tax increases. Just recently
California voters narrowly supported a doubling of their state gasoline
tax, but the tax, which had not been raised for years and is now roughly
equal to the national average, was part of a widely lobbied proposition
to relax stringent limits on state expenditures. Airports are currently
limited by law on the amount of revenue they can raise from pricing.
Because of budgetary concerns, all levels of government are reluctant to
increase---or in some cases even maintain--current spending on infra-
structure without a committed source of additional revenue. The impact
of politics has become clear: current calls for action have largely
triggered finger-pointing.
By comparison, the political difficulties of efficient infrastructure
pricing are manageable. The key to overcoming political objections to
efficient infrastructure pricing is combining it with efficient investment
and publicizing the expected outcome for beneficiaries. In the long run,
no major highway interests will be harmed by efficient road wear pricing
and investment. In the short run, the trucking industry would be hurt if
charges were immediately set to marginal cost at current levels of
durability. Political tensions could be minimized if road wear charges
were initially set midway between current and ideal marginal-cost
charges, with a definite schedule for reducing the charges to reflect
planned improvements to road durability. Congestion pricing need not
raise political objections if toll revenues are used in part to compensate
lower-income drivers, in which case congestion pricing would work to
the benefit of all income classes.
In the long run, efficient pricing and investment for airports will
25 I interpret politically unfavorable redistribution as occurring when a well-defined
economic interest, such as the trucking industry, or a social stratum, especially a
disadvantaged one such as the poor, is made worse off.HOW EFFICIENT IS CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AND PRICING? 199
lead to higher user fees only for general aviation. Compensation could
be provided by using some of the toll revenues to upgrade navigational
aids at general aviation (reliever) airports. This would make these
airports far more attractive to fliers driven from commercial airports by
higher tolls. In the short run all aircraft would face higher user fees.
Thus landing and takeoff fees should be initially set midway between
current and ideal marginal cost charges, with a definite schedule for
reducing the charges as additional runways are built or as technological
aids are implemented. The losses to commercial travelers could also be
softened by reductions in the 8 percent ticket tax used primarily to
support air traffic control.
Current strains on federal and state budgets have put a damper on
proposals that call for an increase in infrastructure spending. But the
findings presented earlier indicate that efficient infrastructure invest-
ment, coupled with efficient pricing, will generally improve federal and
state budget balances in the long run and will lead to an approximately
balanced budget for those facilities where some congestion is optimal.
Budgetary demands will be fairly minor in the short run because
efficient pricing will reduce initial capital outlays and because these
outlays will be made efficiently.
Privatization of Infrastructure Facilities
The objective of efficient infrastructure policy is to maximize the
welfare of the public. Can this goal be accomplished in the public sector?
Some analysts believe it cannot because policymakers typically pursue
their own interests, which are frequently in conflict with the efficiency
aspects of welfare maximization. Privatization of public infrastructure is
therefore advocated on the grounds that policymakers will never imple-
ment efficient pricing and investment; efficient pricing and investment
would be pursued only by privately run enterprises subject to compet-
itive market forces.
In practice, of course, most parts of the country do not have
alternative roads and airports that could facilitate competition. Thus
privatization would typically amount to franchised monopolies with
regulatory oversight.26 It is not clear, however, that this type of market
organization would improve on publicly provided and priced infrastruc-
ture. The argument is that substantial welfare gains would result from
legislation requiring the public sector to implement efficient pricing and
investment guidelines. Policymakers would not have to implement
For a discussion of privatization of highways see Poole (1988); for a discussion of
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these guidelines precisely in order to realize most of the benefits, nor
would they have much latitude to adjust pricing and investment levels
to pursue other objectives.
Shapiro and Willig (1990) have shown that privatization will not
improve upon public enterprise unless the political system compelling
public officials to pursue public interest objectives fails to reach a given
threshold. In contrast, public enterprise could be superior to privatiza-
tion if public officials have private information regarding the public
impact of the enterprise activity.
A fundamental problem with privatization that could lead to serious
inefficiencies is that it gives the owners and managers informational
autonomy from the regulator of the enterprise. For example, the staff of
Virginia’s State Corporation Commission recently cited "a number of
unknowns and uncertainties" as justification for holding up the prog-
ress of a private firm’s plan to extend a toll road from Washington, D.C.
to suburban Dulles Airport. Another problem is that to the extent that
regulators have a final say over pricing and investment, they may not
approve efficient levels. However, a privatized facility, such as a toll
road, could be used as a demonstration project to show policymakers
the effects of an efficient policy.
Privatization is starting to gain the attention of policymakers. But it
faces obvious political obstacles and could be inferior to public enter-
prise. Nonetheless, the privatization movement has helped focus atten-
tion on the need to pursue more efficient pricing and investment
policies. There is justification for believing, however, that these policies
could be implemented effectively in the public sector.
Significantly Increasing Infrastructure Spending
A consensus has developed among many economists, some policy-
makers, and a large part of the public that capital investment in roads
and airports must be increased substantially. The belief of most econo-
mists that public infrastructure spending should be substantially in-
creased has been shaped largely by the work of Aschauer (1989), who
finds that the decline in public works capital spending has been a major
factor in the recent productivity slowdown. His findings suggest that
large capital investments in public infrastructure produce enormous
benefits.
My 1991 paper questions the accuracy of Aschauer’s findings. His
estimates imply that a one-time $60 billion increase in public works
capital spending would achieve a benefit-cost ratio that exceeds 10:1 and
would pay for itself in just one year. This return is implausible. Charles
Schultze (1990) argues that Aschauer’s findings simply demonstrate that
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similar, and that this correlation generates grossly inflated estimates of
the return to public infrastructure investment.
A fundamental flaw also exists in efforts to solve infrastructure
problems by making substantial capital investments in new facilities or
technologies, as can be illustrated by the following example. Pick any
pothole-laden, congested, two-lane road in an urban area. Suppose
public funds are used to widen the road to four lanes and repave it.
Benefits will immediately flow from this investment in the form of faster
travel time and less vehicle damage. But many travelers who previously
avoided the road during peak travel periods will now find the road
attractive to use. The short-term improvements will also induce irrevers-
ible decisions on land use and vehicle purchase. Before long the road
will again fill to capacity and will steadily deteriorate. The correspond-
ing social costs of congestion and road wear will be even higher than
before the investment because more travelers use the road.27 To gener-
alize from this example, the money spent on new facilities or technolo-
gies would result in expanded transportation capacity that eventually
faces the same problems as before but now requires even more money
to "fix."
Although the empirical and conceptual basis for making large
public infrastructure investments is highly suspect, this approach has
generated interest in the social payoff from increased infrastructure
spending. I found that the benefit-cost ratio for efficient investment in
roads and airports is roughly 4:1,28 and it can be obtained with only a
small increase in annualized capital expenditures. Most importantly,
efficient investment and efficient pricing will provide a long-run solution
to infrastructure problems, a goal that cannot be met by just increasing
spending.
Are Policymakers Interested in Efficient Infrastructure
Policy?
My goal in this paper is to proselytize. I realize, however, that many
will remain skeptical about the practicability of efficient pricing and
investment until it is clear that some policymakers have been convinced.
27 The social costs on this road will be partly offset if congestion and road wear are
reduced on alternative roads.
28 Although the benefits from efficient investment represent Pareto improvements
and Aschauer’8 represent productivity gains, this cannot account for Aschauer’s benefit-
cost ratio (10:1) exceeding the ratio for optimal investment by such a large amount.202 Clifford M. Winston
To this point, a few have stepped forward and many are thinking
seriously about it.29
The Bush administration has admittedly set back the cause of
efficient policy. The National Transportation Plan (Moving America: New
Directions, New Opportunities) mentions efficient pricing and investment
in only a vague way, if at all, and usually refers to it in connection with
inefficient policies.30
Although the Administration appears reluctant to take a clear
position, it could pressure the states to implement efficient infrastruc-
ture policy. In fact, some signs indicate that the Administration would
be willing to play this role. Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner
has argued that if the states are forced to contribute a greater share of
highway expenditures, then they will pay more attention to how the
money is spent. The government has also proposed a plan that would
enable airports to impose new fees to raise money, with the money to be
spent only on projects that would increase capacity.
These proposals suggest ways the federal government could en-
courage highway and airport authorities to make more efficient invest-
ments. The authorities and the federal government would be better off
if the federal government also encouraged efficient pricing. Many of the
authorities would become financially self-sufficient, and the federal
government’s deficit would be reduced. The debate over each level of
government’s share of capital expenditures would become irrelevant.
The challenge still remains to convince both parties that their interests
would be served by efficient infrastructure policy.
Greater interest in efficient infrastructure policy is developing in
Congress. A group of representatives, the "House Wednesday Group,"
has identified the Small, Winston and Evans (1989) proposal for efficient
highway pricing and investment as a policy option in addressing
highway needs.31 Because Congress will be debating the Highway
Reauthorization Act during 1991, this proposal could receive serious
consideration. Legislation has also been proposed in the House that
includes consideration of efficient pricing to reduce congestion in airport
29 In a highly misleading discussion of this paper at the conference, Alan Altshuler
characterized the paper as claiming that efficient infrastructure policy would be imple-
mented in this country. This claim is never made. In this section I do point out
encouraging developments that would probably have been unimaginable when many
economists began to advocate efficient infrastructure policies in the 1960s.
~0 For example, on page 5 it is stated, "For example, local passenger facility charges at
airports and tolls on highways offer significant potential as financing mechanisms where
there is heavy travel demand." I pointed out previously that passenger facility charges are
inefficient; I cannot tell whether the highway tolls that are referred to would be based on
efficiency principles.
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system planning.32 Congressional debate over newly proposed passen-
ger facility charges might also provide an opening for efficient airport
pricing to be considered.
The greatest encouragement thus far has come from individual
states and transportation authorities. On January 1, 1990 Oregon imple-
mented a system in which operators of heavy trucks pay a tax based on
axle weight. The new taxes apply only to vehicles operated at gross
weights above 80,000 pounds, but the Oregon Department of Transpor-
tation is very likely to recommend to the 1991 legislative assembly that
this system be extended to lower gross weights.
Congestion pricing is beginning to receive support and interest
from various government organizations in California. California Depart-
ment of Transportation (Caltrans) Director Robert Best favors it, al-
though the official position of the department is that it is still studying
the possibility.33 To this end, Caltrans and the Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Administration jointly sponsored a University of California confer-
ence on the effects of congestion pricing. In addition, the Southern
California Association of Governments instituted a task force on market
incentives for land use and transportation that recommended conges-
tion pricing. It is now soliciting proposals for demonstration programs
as called for in its latest regional mobility plan.
Various airports have also revealed interest in using the price
mechanism to alleviate congestion. Some congested airports have im-
plemented minimum landing charges for general aviation that exceed
the inefficiently low weight-based fees. Logan Airport in Boston has
gone a step further by significantly raising general aviation landing fees.
This policy attracted attention because it was effective in reducing
congestion, but it was found to be discriminatory and therefore illegal.34
The final step is for airports to recognize that adoption of congestion
pricing will legally meet the objective of reducing delay.35
The interest in and experimentation with efficient infrastructure
policy has significant implications for its future. If axle-weight pricing is
32 See the legislation proposed by Representative Packard.
33 See William Trombley, "Caltrans Embarks Upon the Road to Tomorrow," Los
Angeles Times, July 24, 1989, p. 3.
~4 The revised fees at Logan Airport have been interpreted by some as an example of
the political and legal failures of congestion pricing. But these fees were not congestion
prices because they were not differentiated by time of day and because they were applied
only to general aviation. Fees were actually lowered for larger planes to keep the plan
revenue neutral; this added force to general aviation’s charge that they were being
discriminated against.
3s Congestion pricing would not face the legal problems that arose at Logan Airport
because the prices would be based on costs. Legislation would have to be passed to allow
airports to increase the revenue they can raise from landing fees.204 Clifford M. Winston
successful in Oregon, it could spur adoption by other states and the
federal government. Similarly, if a few California cities and some
airports adopt congestion pricing, other locales are more likely to adopt
it. Given the absence of any other effective long-term solutions, this
chain of events could be responsible for nationwide adoption of efficient
infrastructure policy.~6
Finally, the press is starting to become a source of support. In
response to the National Transportation Plan, a New York Times editorial
criticized Secretary Skinner for not advocating congestion pricing of
airports and axle-weight taxes for highways.37 California has also
received editorial support for congestion pricing.38 Favorable media
attention would probably have been unthinkable a few years ago. This
supportive publicity could bring efficient infrastructure policy closer to
the center of the public debate and possibly persuade policymakers that
there would be.a political payoff from endorsement.
Taken collectively, these are encouraging signs that policymakers
and the public will give efficient infrastructure policy serious consider-
ation. But, as in the case of all policies, whether this consideration
translates into adoption depends on the momentum generated. Thus far
isolated instances of support are found, which could possibly grow into
wider acceptance. But waiting for a gradual buildup of support among
local, state, and federal policymakers almost surely means at least
another decade of waste. It is time to seize the opportunity to improve
the nation’s infrastructure and at the same time husband scarce federal
funds. Efficient infrastructure policy is an issue crying out for a leader.
36 Evidence from intrastate airline fares in California and from unregulated produce
rates in trucking helped to convince policymakers that nationwide deregulation of airlines
and motor carriers would lead to lower prices.
37 See New York Times editorial, "Mr. Bush’s Squeeze on Cities," March 11, 1990.
38 See the editorials cited in Small, Winston and Evans (1989) p. 92.
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Alan A. Altshuler*
Clifford Winston has summarized well the case for economic
"efficiency" in infrastructure pricing and investment, and nicely fleshed
it out with some highway and air transport examples. Though I might
quibble about a few supporting arguments,11 have no real disagreement
with Winston on the merits.
Fortunately, though--since I might otherwise have been reduced to
silence--Winston refuses to be contained by his discipline. He knows
full well that for an economist to argue on behalf of marginal cost pricing
and investment is scarcely big news. So he proceeds beyond the merits,
to explain why he believes the political world may be on the verge of
readiness to follow sound economic advice. In so venturing he captured
my rapt attention. This would be newsworthy! But I remain unper-
suaded.
Permit me to explain why, but then also to differentiate among the
measures Winston recommends. It strikes me that they vary widely in
potential feasibility, even if the political system continues to function
about as it has for years.
The main points of evidence that Winston adduces in support of his
political optimism are as follows:
*Ruth and Frank Stanton Professor of Urban Policy and Planning, Harvard University.
1 For example, Winston suggests that congestion pricing would, by inducing some
motorists to utilize transit, reduce transit deficits. In practice, transit patronage and deficits
tend to rise in tandem, because rising demand tends to be accompanied by increased
service and every service unit tends to lose money.DISCUSSION 207
When economists first began to argue for airline and truck
deregulation in the 1960s, these ideas seemed as implausible
politically as congestion pricing and the other key elements of
"efficient" infrastructure policy seem today.
The specific idea of an axle-weight truck tax has recently been
adopted in Oregon, though only for vehicles operated at gross
weights in excess of 80,000 pounds.
Road congestion charges can now be levied by an automatic
vehicle identification (AVI) system and periodic billing, like
cellular telephone charges. Toll booths, with all the delay and
inconvenience they entail, would no longer be required except for
occasional users whose vehicles lacked AVI system capability.
Toll systems need not be regressive. Lower-income drivers could
be compensated directly, or the revenues could be used to
support programs of primary benefit to lower-income people.
Vested interests that are well-heeled might be won over in the
same way. For example, general aviation interests would be
first-order victims of a congestion fee system at major airports,
but they could be compensated by use of some congestion fee
revenue to upgrade general aviation airports.
A few Congressmen and state and local officials, most notably in
California, have recently expressed interest in the principles of
"efficient" transportation policy. Several congested airports have
actually raised their minimum landing fees for small aircraft,
though only Boston’s Logan Airport sought to implement "sig-
nificant" increases and these were struck down judicially. Finally,
The New York Times has editorialized in favor of airport congestion
pricing and truck axle-weight taxation.
Two features of this argument stand out. First, the evidence cited is
at most weakly suggestive. Second, it is one-sided. Winston, who states
openly that his "goal in this paper is to proselytize," makes no pretense
of weighing contrary evidence in the balance. Permit me to comment,
then, on his points and to suggest a few others that seem pertinent.
The deregulation case is indeed a suggestive precedent, in that
economists’ arguments for efficiency eventually prevailed over some
very entrenched interests. Reference to this episode can too easily
become a mantra, however, like the phrase: "If we were able to send a
man to the moon .... " With respect to the instant case, note that
deregulation did not require politicians to take responsibility for any tax,
price, or public expenditure increases. Its great political attraction was as
an anti-inflation measure that required government simply to do less.
Indeed, as John Kingdon notes, a key contextual element was Jimmy
Carter’s campaign theme of "getting government off your back" (King-208 Alan A. Altshuler
don 1984; and compare, more generally, Altshuler and Teal 1979;
Derthick and Quirk 1985; Robyn 1987).
Oregon’s adoption of an axle-weight truck tax may prove a harbin-
ger of things to come. A couple of cautionary notes, however. Winston
notes that the tax will apply only to vehicles with gross weight in excess
of 80,000 pounds. This happens to be the federal Interstate Gross
Weight Limit, and few states authorize higher loads at all without
special permits. (Compare National Cooperative Highway Research
Program 1988, Table B-1.) The Oregon tax will therefore affect a tiny
proportion of commercial shipments. Large truckers have long been
accustomed to paying higher taxes, fees, and tolls than the owners of
lighter vehicles. They have also been egregiously undercharged relative
to their impact on road wear, of course, but Winston does not provide
any information on the magnitude of the new Oregon fees, or their
relation to other motor vehicle taxes. Thus it is impossible to determine
whether even this one state, with respect to this one trucking category,
has taken a major step toward requiring heavy vehicles to pay their own
way.
The technical barriers to congestion pricing have never been central.
Singapore, after all, introduced its downtown area licensing scheme in
1975, and local planners recommended a similar scheme for Central
London in 1974 (Altshuler 1979, p. 360). It is true that sophisticated
systems, varying by time of day and route and extending far beyond
downtown, were not feasible until recently. What I find most striking,
however, is that only Singapore, a one-party quasi-dictatorship, has
been able to implement any form of congestion pricing for a sustained
period. I believe the only other city that has even ventured a pilot is
Hong Kong. As for recent U.S. experience, New York City Transporta-
tion Commissioner Ross Sandler vigorously sought support during the
late 1980s for a downtown area license/toll system. He made his
argument not simply on grounds of efficiency, but also on grounds of
public health and federal air pollution requirements. Technically, he had
two major advantages. The Manhattan central business district is the
most congested area in the nation, and the main vehicular approaches to
downtown are already tolled. Sandler published a fine report, explained
it in as many forums as possible, and persuaded Mayor Koch to chair the
first set of hearings on this proposal. All to no avail. Business, labor, and
nearly all civic groups were intensely hostile, and virtually no support
appeared except from environmental organizations and a few academ-
ics. The idea quietly died.
We have another recent experience with recommendations to shape
motorist behavior by price. The Clean Air Act of 1970 set precise ambient
air quality standards to be achieved by the mid-seventies. Industrial
processes and new cars were to be made to pollute less, and where theseDISCUSSION 209
measures did not suffice, others were to be called into play. Of these, the
most promising by far were high gasoline taxes and parking surcharges.
As the Environmental Protection Agency moved in 1973 toward impos-
ing such charges, however, Congress voted to prohibit them. President
Nixon vetoed the bill in question on unrelated grounds, but the EPA
Administrator took the message to heart. All surcharges previously
included in regional transportation control plans were immediately
suspended. The prohibition on surcharges became law in 1974, none-
theless (Altshuler 1979, p. 195).
The energy crises of the seventies also generated widespread calls
for the utilization of price incentives. Winston calls for a national leader
to take up the cause. He might have been quite pleased in 1977 when a
new President, Jimmy Carter, made reduced oil import dependency his
single highest priority. Carter, who cited national security and prosper-
ity as his justifications rather than mere congestion delays, sought an 11
percent reduction in national gasoline consumption between 1981 and
1985, to be achieved by the utilization of price signals. He recommended
a tax on domestically produced oil, another on "gas-guzzling" cars, and
a standby gasoline tax to be imposed if consumption exceeded the
national target. The last was potentially the strongest measure. The
standby tax was to rise five cents for every 1 percent that consumption
exceeded the prior year’s target. It never made it through a single
congressional committee. In the end, the only Carter recommendation
adopted was a watered-down version of the gas-guzzler tax, expected to
apply at most to a few super-luxury European models (Altshuler 1979,
pp. 136-40). Carter never recovered from the political backlash he stirred
up with these proposals, and the idea of fuel taxation to conserve energy
has never again been a serious item on the national agenda.
Winston calls for ingenuity in the structuring of efficient user fee
and tax systems, to ensure that lower-income people are shielded from
significant harm and that vested interests can be suitably compensated.
Numerous advocates of fuel taxation to conserve energy have come up
with such schemes, however, to no apparent effect. The public and
media seem fiercely protective of existing arrangements. Even the
advocates of high-occupancy vehicle lanes have learned from bitter
experience to implement them only when new or contra-flow lanes are
available, because the public reacts so negatively to having existing
peak-direction lanes taken out of service.
While congestion pricing might in theory benefit everyone, one
must recall that utility is a subjective matter. Many people fear that they
would be driven from the roads during peak periods, others would pay
but hate it, and still others would distrust any politician promising that
new revenue will be used wisely. The media can be counted on to fan
these flames when serious proposals are put forward. Those who would210 Alan A. Altshuler
be happy to pay for reduced congestion are few and too weakly
motivated to become politically active. To my knowledge, they never
have done so. As I have written elsewhere on this topic, I shall say no
more here (Altshuler 1979, pp. 342-52, 355-69).
With reference to Winston’s final point, that one can point to a few
public officials and editorial writers who support efficient infrastructure
pricing, who can doubt it? But how do their numbers and their levels of
commitment compare to those who since 1973 have favored higher fuel
taxes to conserve energy and reduce air pollution?
During the federal budget battles of recent years, various commen-
tators have remarked that while tax cuts and spending programs have
constituencies, there is no significant constituency for a balanced bud-
get. Within most program areas, certainly including infrastructure, one
can say the same about "efficiency."
Institutions are organized around key values. And the values
around which the American political system is organized routinely
conflict with efficiency. These include broad democratic responsiveness,
the preservation of individual liberty, the protection of minority groups
from majority tyranny, and avoidance of concentrated executive power.
The system’s myriad checks and balances channel decision-making
toward pluralistic compromise and logrolling. Its openness to popular
sentiment, combined with its internal fragmentation and lack of control
over the media, tends to preclude effective efforts to challenge ingrained
public attitudes. (The courts can do so at times, particularly when
constitutional values are at stake, but this need not concern us here.) Its
direct democratic elements, which have been greatly strengthened over
the course of the present century--nomination by direct primary,
legislation by referendum, the decline of political parties, sunshine and
citizen participation requirements, vastly increased mobilization of spe-
cial interest groups--tend to sap both the will and capacity of elected
officials to "educate" rather than "respond to" their constituents. On
the whole, American politicians are more scared, more dependent on
special interest support, more isolated from one another (in the absence
of meaningful parties), and less confident of their ability to overcome
gridlock on controversial issues than at any time in our recent history.
These are quite conventional points. They represent basic first
steps, however, toward understanding why American infrastructure
policy has been far more responsive to group pressures and broad
popular attitudes than to efficiency arguments, and why it is likely to
remain so.
This is not to say that progress toward efficiency in infrastructure
policy is inconceivable. It is to suggest, however, that efficiency reforms
are likely to fare very differently in the political arena, depending on the
types of benefits they confer, which shibboleths they challenge, andDISCUSSION 211
whose oxen they gore. There are not many guides to this estimation
problem in which I have confidence, but here are a few simple ones.
Reforms with narrow direct impact will be more feasible than those of
wider scope. Reforms that call for business regulation and/or taxation
will be more feasible than those that would be salient for large numbers
of voters. The least feasible reforms will be those that would require
politicians to take direct responsibility for imposing significant new
charges and regulations on the mass public. The most feasible will be
those that would extend familiar arrangements for easily understood
purposes (for example, gas tax increases to finance new highways), and
those that would confer large, easily understood benefits on well-
mobilized groups without requiring politicians to antagonize many
constituents.
What are the implications with respect to Winston’s proposed
reforms? First and foremost, I conclude that road congestion charges
remain a political loser. The time to reconsider this judgment will be
when some public toll-road authorities have eliminated commuter (read:
peak period) discounts in favor of peak period surcharges.
Second, I judge that a shift in the basis of truck taxation from gross
weight to axle weight, as Winston and colleagues have proposed, is
quite plausible. This would amount to a modest revision of a long-
standing arrangement. The more difficult question is whether trucking
taxes will increase sufficiently under this scheme to bring about a major
reduction in the implicit subsidy heavy trucks have long received. Here
I have severe doubts, since the general nature of this subsidy has been
well understood for decades. The problem is that commercial truckers
are very strongly motivated to preserve this subsidy, while automobile
owners and renters, who pay it, are very weakly motivated to oppose it.
Third, I believe that pricing strategies to alleviate airport congestion
are forthcoming. Air traffic delays are of interest to large numbers of
voters as well as to commercial airlines. It seems unlikely that runway
and terminal expansion, or air traffic control improvement, will be
sufficient to alleviate airport congestion in the face of rapid traffic growth
in the decades ahead. The great question is whether the problem will
become so severe that politicians are willing to challenge the general
aviation lobby.
I doubt that Winston’s proposed compensation scheme will discern-
ibly mitigate general aviation opposition. It is not new. It has never
worked before; why should it work now? Three easier paths to airport
congestion pricing remain, however. One is simply to conduct periodic
auctions of peak-period landing slots at congested airports, while
reserving a percentage .for general aviation. A second path would be to
raise all landing fees proportionately in peak periods at congested
airports, without requiring airlines to endure the risk of auctions. The212 Alan A. Altshuler
issue here would be to find an acceptable means of distributing the
revenue--rebating it in the form of reduced fees during off-peak
periods, using it to reduce other taxes, or using it to finance airport
improvements. A third strategy would be for the federal government to
deregulate in this area, giving state and local airport authorities wide
discretion to manage congestion. This reform would be in tune with
deregulation of the private aviation industry and with the Reagan-Bush
New Federalism ideology. Within a decentralized framework, authori-
ties in several of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas would probably
move quickly to adopt runway congestion pricing.
Finally, what about "optimal investment?" Winston’s paper makes
clear that this is a many-faceted topic. One can easily imagine the
argument for thicker pavement that Winston and colleagues have
developed triumphing fairly quickly. Pavement thickness is generally
considered to be a matter for professional determination. Greater
pavement thickness would not inconvenience anyone. And, if Winston
is correct, this policy would enable government officials to take prompt
credit for monetary savings as well as road quality improvements.
Politicians will still be tempted to spread highway paving funds around
more widely, but they are likely to accept clear engineering standards if
these are forthcoming.
Optimal investment more broadly considered is another matter,
however. In the absence of efficient road pricing, it does not make a
great deal of sense to talk about optimal highway investment. And even
if it did, Winston has not suggested any benefits that would be likely to
induce politicians to give up pluralistic bargaining as the main basis for
determining highway budget limits and distributing funds within them.
Nor are airport authorities likely to build new runways as "rationally" as
Winston suggests. Even where airports have land available, new run-
ways generally stir major community and environmental conflict. Win-
ston writes that noise pollution concerns might be met by arguing that
additional runways would lead to reduced traffic concentration. The
opponents would reply, of course, that increased runway capacity
facilitates the accommodation of increased total volume. And they
would be correct.
In short, there seems little reason to believe that economic efficiency
is about to triumph in the infrastructure policy arena. But the political
system is considerably more amenable to some reforms than others.
Considerable waste motion may be avoided if one keeps hope in check
while striving to discern which are which.DISCUSSION 213
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These ~omments will highlight some of the important innovations
in the Clifford Winston approach to how to think about infrastructure
problems, some areas of possible extension of the author’s arguments,
and some concerns about how his approach might be applied to other
categories of infrastructure (especially those categories relating to envi-
ronmental protection) and about how the Winston solution might be
implemented. In order to put my comments and reactions into perspec-
tive, however, I want to first give some background on the National
Council on Public Works Improvement.
In the early 1980s, a number of studies raised serious questions
about the condition of the nation’s infrastructure and its ability to
support continued economic development and promote international
competitiveness (Choate and Walter 1981; Associated General Contrac-
tors 1983; Congressional Budget Office 1983; National Infrastructure
Advisory Committee 1984). In response to the concerns expressed in
those studies, Congress created the National Council on Public Works
Improvement (NCPWI) to report on the state of the nation’s infrastruc-
ture and to develop a strategy to ensure that this infrastructure will be
adequate to support future economic growth and promote continued
international competitiveness.
Throughout its two years of activity, the Council kept coming back
to one fundamental question: If we as a nation had an extra dollar to
spend, should we spend it on infrastructure rather than on health care,
education, or the homeless? and, if we spend it on infrastructure,
*Principal Research Scientist, Institute for Policy Studies, The Johns Hopkins Univer-
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should we spend it on operations and maintenance or on new construc-
tion, and on what category of infrastructure? The Council recognized that
increased investment in infrastructure is just one of many critical claims on
the nation’s resources. To respond to this and other claims requires coming
to grips with the growing imbalance between consumption on the one
hand and investment and saving on the other. This imbalance, reflected in
the federal budget deficit and in other forms of borrowing against the
fu~re, affects all federal spending decisions (NCPWI 1988). Until this
imbalance is addressed, the practical question remains how to ensure the
maximum level and quality of infrastructure services given available
resources, irrespective of whether or to what degree those resources might
be considered inadequate. In other words, how can the nation spend
limited resources on public infrastructure and avoid past mistakes of
building canals or industrial parks that are not used?1
In pursuing this line of inquiry, the Council ran into a couple of
major roadblocks. First, traditional needs studies provide no informa-
tion on how specific physical infrastructure facilities are actually used.
Rather, if a bridge is determined to be structurally deficient by the
federal government it should be renovated to meet agreed-upon engi-
neering standards, whether it handles 1,000 cars or ten cars per day. No
useful information was readily accessible on the economic benefits
provided by such facilities or, more importantly, the demand for
infrastructure services.
Second, no analysis or data provided a link between actual dollar
expenditures on new investment and/or operations and maintenance
and the level and quality of infrastructure services resulting from such
expenditures. For example, real per capita investment in public works
decreased from 1965 to 1984 in absolute terms and relative to GNP, but
real per capita spending on operations and maintenance increased over
the same period at about the same rate as GNP. However, we cannot say
how either trend affected the overall level and quality of infrastructure
services being provided (NCPWI 1986). The lack of such a linkage is still
a major impediment to extracting meaningful policy recommendations
from analytical work that relates aggregate dollar flows of infrastructure
spending to national productivity, gross state products, regional em-
ployment, or other measures of economic activity. Such macro studies
can help make the general point that as a nation we need to spend more
on infrastructure, but these studies provide little guidance as to how
those expenditures should be allocated to obtain the highest level and
quality of infrastructure services.
In my view, the Winston approach to analyzing infrastructure
Examples provided by Joel Tarr during his oral presentation at this conference,216 Michael E. Bell
issues makes some significant contributions toward filling the informa-
tional gaps faced by the Council.
Major Contributions
One of the themes that runs throughout the work of the National
Council on Public Works Improvement is the fact that physical infra-
structure facilities, the focus of traditional needs studies, are not ends in
themselves, but rather are important for the services they provide. Thus
¯ . . from a public policy standpoint, it may be equally, if not more, important
to consider the adequacy or inadequacy of a community’s infrastructure
based on the output, or level of service provided, as opposed to its physical
condition alone. (1986, p. 12.)
This perspective on the infrastructure problem is a radical departure
from the logic of traditional needs studies, but it is critical for developing
meaningful policy initiatives because it opens the door to consideration
of alternative, low-capital-intensive, means of providing infrastructure
services. The Winston approach to the infrastructure issue is consistent
with this perspective. For example, Winston states that "... efficient
highway pricing and investment could dramatically improve the condi-
tion and performance of our roads and require only a small increase in
capital spending." (Winston, this volume, emphasis added.)
Second, the Council found little evidence directly linking dollar
expenditures on infrastructure investment, operation, and maintenance
and the level and quality of service provided. The Winston paper
explicitly links spending on capital investments and operations and
maintenance requirements for highways and airports. Thus, Winston is
able to discuss an efficient investment strategy and the implications it
has for future maintenance requirements. This represents an inno’cative
effort to systemati~ally apply a life-cycle cost approach to questions of
investment in and maintenance of the national highway network.
Third, recognizing that infrastructure services and performance are
important and depend on how facilities are used, Winston makes
efficient pricing of those services a central theme of his proposal. He
differentiates components of demand and considers efficient pricing for
both system capacity and durability. He extends the discussion of
pricing to consider the implications of such an efficient pricing strategy
for the demand for transportation services, how the delivery of those
services might shift between modes of transportation as a result of
changes in relative prices, and how the delivery of services might
change in response to such price incentives by more efficiently combin-
ing private capital (multi-axle trucks instead of single-axle trucks) with
~ public capital (highways). In essence, the approach moves toward a
general equilibrium analysis of infrastructure issues.DISCUSSION 217
Finally, the author raises legitimate questions about the benefits to
be derived from privatization. The types of infrastructure categories
discussed in the Winston paper, and by the National Council on Public
Works Improvement, do have private good characteristics: for example,
identifiable users who can be charged a price and excluded from using
the facility or service if they do not pay that price. However, this does
not create a competitive market for those services. Rather, as Winston
points out, it creates a situation for a regulated monopoly that may or
may not be efficient, depending on the extent of contestable markets,
the incentive structure created by the regulators, and so on. He correctly
argues that privatization is no panacea.
In my view, the analysis presented in the paper makes important
contributions to the methods by which we should define, describe, and
analyze infrastructure problems. Applying this approach to other cate-
gories of infrastructure, with a focus on services, how those services are
priced, and the implications of that pricing strategy for how the services
are provided, would indeed move the nation toward an efficient infra-
structure policy. However, it is possible to extend this analytic approach
beyond the discussion in Winston’s paper.
Extensions of Winston’s Analytic Approach
The first area for potential extension is the question of defining the
output or product of expenditures on public infrastructure. For example,
the author states that highways produce two "products": (1) traffic
volume requiring capacity and (2) standard loadings requiring durabil-
ity. Alternatively, he states that airports produce two "outputs": (1)
commercial carrier operations and (2) general aviation operations. The
highway definition focuses on physical characteristics of publicly pro-
vided capital, such as the number of lanes and pavement thickness. The
airport definition focuses on services provided by the combination of
public and private capital.
As mentioned above, physical infrastructure facilities are not ends
in themselves, but rather they interact with private capital to produce
a service. In the transportation area, public capital (roads, bridges or
runways) interacts with private capital (cars, trucks or airplanes) to
produce a service (mobility). That service, however, has a quantity and
quality dimension. In the context of a Lancaster-type good, different
characteristics of the service might be considered "products" to the
extent that individual consumers value them differently. Durability,
speed, and safety (for which pavement thickness and lane width might
be possible proxies) are characteristics of transportation services that
heterogeneous users might demand and be willing to pay for.
If one accepts the author’s characterization that the products of218 Michael E. Bell
highways are capacity and durability, other attributes of the network might
be considered equally important "products." For example, safety and
reliability of the system are increasingly important as usage increases and
the economy restructures itself to meet global economic challenges. In
order to identify all such potential "products," it is necessary to understand
fully the link between infrastructure and economic development. For
example, if one accepts the argument, laid out above, that the service
produced by the interaction of public and private capital is mobility, then
public capital is seen to affect economic activity by complementing, rather
than substituting for, private capital. In fact, empirical evidence consistent
with this perspective is increasing (Eberts 1990; Duffy-Deno and Eberts
1989). Thus, public infrastructure can be considered an unpaid factor of
production within a firm’s production function (as an intermediate good)
and the demand for infrastructure services is a derived demand that
depends on the demand for the final product.
In this context, the elasticity of the derived demand curve is of
interest. Assuming for the moment that factor inputs are used in fixed
proportions, the derived demand curve will be more inelastic
(1) the more essential the factor input being considered;
(2) the more inelastic the demand curve for the final product;
(3) the smaller the fraction of total cost that goes to the factor in
question; and
(4) the more inelastic the supply curve of the other factors (Fried-
man 1972, p. 153).
To develop an efficient infrastructure policy one must consider the
impact of economic restructuring, both in the United States and glo-
bally, on the demand for and usage patterns of transportation infrastruc-
ture. This link between transportation and the economy is influenced by
(1) changes in intra-firm production processes; (2) changes in the
structure of the industrial sector, including both institutional structure
and the types of products being produced; (3) shifts in the location of
various economic activities; and (4) the increasing importance of the
service sector in the economy (Bell and Feitelson 1989). For example, if
one moves to a just-in-time production process, system reliability
becomes important. One might invest in additional system capacity
even if current capacity is not congested in terms of travel time.
In this context, the products of the transportation network (capac-
ity, durability, safety, access to remote areas, and reliability) become
important in identifying and measuring social benefits from transporta-
tion investment. Thus, when Winston argues that efficient infrastruc-
;ture policy should equate marginal social benefits and marginal social
costs, social benefits need to be interpreted broadly to include system
and network effects as well as other attributes besides travel time and
pavement thickness.DISCUSSION 219
In addition to the definition of output, a second area for potential
extension is the notion of efficient pricing. The author argues that users
of infrastructure impose costs on themselves and others by contributing
to congestion and by wearing out the infrastructure. Thus, his efficient
pricing strategy contains a pavement wear charge to promote efficient
investment and a congestion charge to regulate capacity. This charac-
terization of the social costs associated with automobile usage ignores a
major social cost, namely the environmental cost.
The automobile provides mobility and convenience that are partic-
ularly attuned to the American desire for personal freedom. As a result,
the automobile dominates the nation’s transportation network. Yet the
automobile also threatens our quality of life by contaminating both
urban air and the global atmosphere (Gray and Alson 1989). Transpor-
tation consumes more than 60 percent of all petroleum used in the
United States and accounts for over one-half of all hazardous air toxins,
including 40 percent of all hydrocarbon emissions and two-thirds of
carbon monoxide emissions. As a result, automobile exhaust continues
to come under fire from environmentalists (Wright 1990).
Gasoline prices in Europe and Japan are double or triple the U.S. price
because of government levies that force consumers to internalize a greater
share of the social cost of their behavior. Thus, to hold down oil consump-
tion and the resulting hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions, our
pricing policies must be revised to reflect all energy-related costs (Gibbons,
Blair and Gwin 1989). In this context, to be a truly efficient pricing strategy,
Winston’s pricing proposal should be extended to include a carbon or
climate protection tax based on Btus generated from burning coal and oil
(Ruckelshaus 1989). Such a tax could have a more profound impact on the
demand and supply of transportation services than the road wear and
congestion charges proposed by the author.
Implementation Concerns
I have two basic concerns about how the strategy outlined by
Winston will be applied for both environmental protection categories of
infrastructure and transportation. The first deals with the social accept-
ability of some of his suggestions. The second deals with the application
of pricing schemes, common in transportation, to the environmental
field where pricing is less common.
The computer industry is full of examples of technologically feasible
activities that consumers have just not accepted, such as banking by
telephone or personal computer. The congestion pricing scheme suggested
by the author may encounter such public resistance. Some would argue
that as a nation we have shown a willingness to make personal sacrifices
for economic or other security. For example, some argue that our consti-220 Michael E. Bell
tutional rights have been compromised by unreasonable airport searches
instituted to reduce the risk of hijackings. More recently, some argue that
random drug testing in order to secure safer transportation services violates
the same rights. However, it is not clear whether individuals will condone
the government monitoring individual travel patterns, as suggested by
Winston, in order to receive a more accurate bill for their use of the nation’s
highway network. Will such a monitoring scheme, although it may be
technically feasible, be socially acceptable? While the jury is still out on that
issue in the United States, it is my understanding that after an initial trial
period, a plan to make such a pricing scheme permanent was voted down
by residents in Hong Kong.
Assume for the moment that technically feasible means of pricing
are accepted. An important implementation issue is how to adapt such
fees to the environmental area. It is generally agreed that a pricing
strategy similar to that outlined by Winston will improve economic
efficiency. That awareness has contributed to the growing acceptance by
politicians and others of the notion (or at least the rhetoric) of market
incentives as one way to address emerging environmental problems--
problems associated with a large number of relatively small, dispersed
polluters in contrast to the traditional command and control approach of
dealing with a single large identifiable polluter.
Attention is now shifting toward how such strategies might be
implemented. One level of concern focuses on the winners and losers
from these policy initiatives. Such distributional issues contribute to
current difficulties in producing a clean air bill (Hager 1990; Levin 1990).
Winston identifies and addresses some distributional implications of his
pricing strategy and discusses some potential remedies. However, the
issue is more troublesome in the environmental area. The objective of
the "polluter pays" principle is to reduce the production, use, and
discharge of substances that harm the environment, by equating price
with marginal social costs (Winston, this volume). Thus, losers from
such a policy could go out of business or incur significant cost increases.
Compensation, based on such increased costs, could effectively mitigate
the incentive effects of a more efficient pricing policy.
A second concern is the administrative and compliance costs of
implementing such economic incentives. For example, for effluent fees
to have a meaningful impact on polluting activity, detailed data are
required on the industry’s cost curves and total releases. My under-
standing is that no such analysis has been performed to analyze the
impact of Super Fund taxes on the chemical industry, or to justify the
levels of excise taxes on ozone-depleting chemicals.
More analysis along the lines of Winston’s transportation work needs
to be done in the environmental area. This will require that significant
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regulators. In addition, the use of tradable pollution prevention permits
will require monitoring and enforcement of individual permits, which may
change hands a number of times (Feitelson 1990).
A final concern is with the overall effectiveness of economic tools as
implemented through a political process. Recent studies provide evi-
dence that some tradable permit schemes have not worked as antici-
pated and do not lead to more efficient outcomes (Hahn 1989; Malueg
1989). These failures may be related more to how the program was
designed and implemented than to the effectiveness of economic instru-
ments generally. However, it is important to consider whether such
economic incentives would require fees that would be politically unpal-
atable if set high enough to affect the behavior of a firm or individual,
when new materials represent only a small portion of the cost of most
finished products (Levin 1990).
This raises a fundamental question about the political feasibility of
implementing an efficient infrastructure policy as outlined by Winston.
In his paper he addresses one narrow dimension of the distributional
consequences of such a policy, namely how to allocate the revenues
generated under an efficient pricing scheme to mitigate the cost to some
of the losers, for example low-income highway users, those shifting to
mass transit, and others who face a higher cost of obtaining transpor-
tation services. However, the paper does not address the larger, and
politically more significant, distributional issue of compensating those
who lose when expenditures in the transportation area fall from an
estimated $20 billion to $25 billion annually to $5 billion or $10 billion as
estimated by Winston.2 It is not clear what motivation a politician will
have to step forward and promote such economic efficiency.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the approach toward infrastructure issues
taken by Winston is fundamentally sound and should be extended to
other categories of infrastructure. In order to develop the sustainable
economic development strategy necessary to support the ten billion
people who will inhabit the world in the next century, our consumption
of goods and services, including infrastructure services, must reflect the
total social costs associated with that behavior. Winston’s efficient
pricing proposal can play an important role in that strategy, but it must
2 The presentation of the numbers in the Winston paper is somewhat confusing. For
example, he talks about an increase in highway investment of $1.3 billion, but then he
adds that to the estimated $1.5 billion total investment for airports. Similarly, Table 1 is
misleading to the extent that it represents expenditures and savings in a future year
without any discussion of the costs and savings that would be experienced before that year
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be extended to cover total social costs, not just congestion, pavement
thickness, or noise. Similarly, before specific policy recommendations
can be made regarding future funding requirements, a broader concept
of social benefits must be developed that will reflect the total benefits of
an adequate transportation network in a changing global economy.
Only then will the nation have a truly efficient infrastructure policy.
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